It's been five plus weeks since I started these weekly planet updates and I'm now reasonably confident that I can keep them going for a while. So far I've jumped between topics - AI, energy geopolitics, even animal vocalizations - all in one week.
I'll still perform that kind of scatterbrained coverage but I also want to cover certain key concepts in depth. Starting today, I'll make each week about one core concept. This week's concept is the Electrostate. By “electrostate,” I mean a country that (a) runs more of its economy on electricity instead of direct fossil-fuel combustion (the consumer electrostate) and (b) builds, exports, or controls key clean-energy technologies (the producer electrostate).
Note: many headers are links to an essay by someone else
The trajectory of modernization has always been inextricably linked to the mastery of energy. Coal powered Britain's rise; oil powered America's twentieth-century dominance. Now electricity—not fossil fuels—is becoming the main energy “currency” of modern life. The emergence of electrostates is not just an energy transition; it is a fundamental restructuring of how nations build power, prosperity, and influence. This shift from ideology to infrastructure as the organizing principle of geopolitical competition marks a new stage in modernization.
The Metabolic Foundation of Power
To understand the significance of electrostates, we must first recognize that energy regimes don't just power economies—they shape the architecture of political power and social organization. The rise of petrostates in the twentieth century shows this clearly. Nations controlling oil and gas resources gained outsized influence not simply through resource endowments but through their ability to fuel the industrial machinery that defined modern civilization. Their power was geological, extracted from finite underground deposits that could be weaponized through embargoes and price manipulation.
Today, we're witnessing something qualitatively different. The divide between nations is no longer primarily ideological—communism versus capitalism—but infrastructural. There's a growing split between electrostates, those building industrial capacity for clean energy technologies and electric consumption, and carbon states, whose economic and political institutions remain deeply tied to fossil fuels. This distinction runs deeper than production methods; it shapes the entire metabolic structure of society. In a carbon state, fossil fuels infiltrate every aspect of life—from home heating to gasoline-powered transportation—creating tentacles of dependency that reach into the political economy's deepest recesses. By contrast, even when an electrostate produces electricity from coal, once energy is turned into electricity, the role of fossil fuel ends. It's relatively easy to switch out coal for solar without restructuring society's entire energy metabolism. In short: once you electrify end uses (cars, heating, industry), you can swap in cleaner power at the grid without changing everything downstream.
China as the Archetypal Electrostate
China exemplifies both dimensions of the electrostate model. In 2024 alone, it added hundreds of gigawatts of solar and wind, and renewables covered more than all new electricity demand. Early 2025 continued at record pace. Grid-scale battery storage also surged, with tens of gigawatts added in 2024.
But China's electrostate status extends beyond raw capacity. The nation has achieved what Carnegie Endowment analysts identify as “dual” electrostate status: both a producer and consumer electrostate. As a producer, clean energy sectors comprise over 10% of China's GDP, with the country controlling over 70% of global manufacturing capacity in solar, batteries, and most clean technology segments. China produces roughly three-quarters of global lithium-ion batteries and manufactures the vast majority of neodymium magnets essential for electric motors. Solar manufacturing costs in China are about a third lower than in Europe, around a fifth lower than in the US, and roughly a tenth lower than in India.
As a consumer electrostate, electricity's share of final energy consumption in China has surged to about 30%, now ahead of the US and EU and similar to Japan. This shift isn't accidental. When Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he identified energy dependence as a critical vulnerability. China still imports more oil than any other country, with much flowing through chokepoints like the South China Sea that could be severed in conflict. Electrification offers an escape route that Xi has thrown the full weight of the Chinese state behind. Electrify end uses, then clean up the power supply.
The Architecture of Overlapping Ecosystems
What distinguishes China's electrostate model is its foundation in overlapping tech-industrial ecosystems that create compounding effects across sectors. China doesn't simply have a battery industry or an EV industry—it has all these industries and more, interconnected through shared supply chains, technology, and scale economies. This represents what analysts call a “jigsaw puzzle” approach to industrial policy: the more pieces you already have in technology and domestic manufacturing capacity, the closer you are to filling remaining gaps.
Consider how China's smartphone and consumer electronics industry provided EV makers with suppliers and know-how for touchscreen displays, electronic control systems, and related hardware. Xiaomi's rapid pivot from smartphones to EVs exemplifies this cross-pollination. China's position as the world's largest producer of steel, aluminum, and petrochemical products provides domestic suppliers for industrial inputs. Its lithium battery industry enjoys unprecedented economies of scale by supplying consumer electronics, EVs, and energy storage simultaneously.
This convergence reflects a deeper technological unification. Previously distinct domains—telephones and cars—are merging through shared hardware (lithium batteries, electric motors, sensors, semiconductors) and software (operating systems, AI, data processing). Chinese companies are becoming “tech Swiss Army knives,” starting in one industry but rapidly branching into adjacent domains. BYD exemplifies this model, manufacturing not just EVs but home energy products, drones, and even components for iPads.
The coevolution between technological innovation systems and policymaking makes this ecosystem stronger. Policymakers observe changes in technological functionality and adjust policies accordingly, while industry proponents leverage dynamics to influence policy mixes for their benefit. This creates what researchers call a “mutually reinforcing feedback loop” where China's progress across overlapping industries compounds its competitive advantages.
Redefining Geopolitical Leverage
The electrostate model fundamentally redefines sources of geopolitical power. Where petrostates derived influence from controlling finite underground deposits, electrostates build influence through command of manufacturing capabilities, technological innovation, and the ability to deploy scalable clean energy solutions. This represents a shift from geology-based advantage to knowledge-based supremacy—though critical minerals for batteries and magnets introduce new resource geographies that may prove as influential as oil reserves once were.
China now holds nearly 700,000 clean energy patents—more than half the world's total. Chinese scientific institutions account for around two-thirds of high-impact publications on electric batteries. The Chinese Academy of Sciences leads in six of eight energy and environment technologies globally. Chinese entities' share of patents in electric propulsion increased eleven-fold from about 2% in 2010 to about 27% in 2020.
The implications stretch far beyond China's borders. Chinese companies have crashed the price of clean technology worldwide, with solar panels costing about 90% less than a decade ago. This makes the energy transition affordable for developing countries that couldn't previously access it. Pakistan, after being outbid by Europeans for liquified natural gas in 2022, has imported enough Chinese panels in six years to double its power system capacity. Ethiopia banned imports of combustion engine vehicles, with China setting up EV assembly there. Saudi Arabia, the quintessential petrostate, was the fourth-largest importer of Chinese solar in 2024, planning to electrify its own economy while saving hydrocarbons for export.
The Democratization and Concentration of Energy Power
The electrostate model offers something paradoxical: both democratization of energy potential and new forms of technological dependency. Unlike fossil fuels concentrated in specific geological formations, sunlight and wind are freely available resources. Electrification is significantly more efficient than combustion—electric vehicles and heat pumps require three to four times less energy than fossil-fuel counterparts. Given that three-quarters of the world's population live in countries importing fossil fuels, electrification offers a pathway to greater energy independence.
For most countries, becoming a consumer electrostate—electrifying their economies without leading in clean technology manufacturing—is the more relevant and achievable path. Bangladesh has passed the US and Europe in electricity's share of final consumption despite producing few clean-tech goods. It's mandating solar panels on public buildings to power hospitals and schools. Even when electricity comes from fossil fuels, it's cleaner and more efficient than direct combustion, with benefits for air quality and emissions reduction.
Yet this democratization comes with new dependencies. While sunlight and wind can't be embargoed, access to clean technology manufacturing and control over critical mineral supply chains determine which nations can successfully transition to electrostate status. The global distribution of lithium, rare earth elements, and advanced manufacturing capabilities creates new forms of resource geography. China's overcapacity in manufacturing—with about three-quarters of global clean-tech factory investment in 2024—means profitability is under pressure, with average margins for major Chinese solar firms dropping to about 5% from about 12%. Solar panels have become cheap commodities with minuscule profit margins, making it difficult for other nations to effectively kickstart their own manufacturing until China's domestic price wars end.
Infrastructure as Destiny
The shift from ideology to infrastructure as geopolitical organizing principle reflects a deeper truth about modernization. Infrastructure choices don't just reflect political decisions—they create path dependencies that shape political possibilities for decades. Once a society builds its metabolism around distributed electricity rather than centralized fossil fuel combustion, the entire logic of energy politics changes. Energy security no longer depends on securing distant oil fields or protecting shipping lanes but on maintaining domestic renewable generation and storage capacity.
This infrastructural determinism helps explain emerging geopolitical realignments. Despite current cooperation between China and Russia, their fundamental energy trajectories diverge. Russia remains tightly bound to hydrocarbon rents and fossil-fuel exports, with economic power relying on carbon-intensive trade flows. This limits flexibility and locks in established elite coalitions. We might expect increasing rapprochement between the US and Russia as carbon states despite current tensions, while the divide between electrostates and carbon states deepens.
The comparison between the US and China is particularly stark. America installs about half as many solar panels as Europe annually and is likely losing any clean energy technological edge it once had. While China races ahead with what Climate Energy Finance calls “energy dominance” through renewables, the US doubles down on fossil fuel production. This sets up what some analysts describe as a titanic clash between the US as petrostate (though the US is primarily a chipstate IMHO) and China as electrostate, each pursuing radically different energy strategies that will shape their economic and political futures. (My view: the US is more a “chipstate,” but its current energy posture is still carbon-heavy.)
The Material Future of Progress
The electrostate model also transforms our understanding of material and technological progress. Historically, breakthroughs in materials like aluminum, magnesium, and titanium emerged because society could invest more energy into their production. Energy-intensive materials often deliver improved performance and environmental benefits—lightweight aluminum cans reduce lifecycle emissions compared to glass bottles despite higher production energy requirements.
The evolution of materials isn't limited by energy alone but increasingly by our ability to structure and process them at finer scales. High-entropy and highly structured materials promise vast new possibilities. But these advances depend on abundant clean electricity to power the processing, suggesting that electrostates will lead in next-generation materials science. Countries mastering the electric stack—from raw energy to advanced manufacturing—position themselves at the forefront of material innovation.
A New Historical Phase
The emergence of electrostates represents far more than a technological or economic shift. It marks a new historical phase where the foundations of national power, industrial strength, and development strategy are being fundamentally redefined. Where previous eras saw nations rise through mastery of coal or oil, the twenty-first century will be shaped by those who lead in clean energy technology and electrified infrastructure.
This transformation promises to reshape how nations compete and cooperate, and how they define their own development trajectories. The electrostate model offers a vision of modernization that could break the historical link between economic growth and environmental degradation—though realizing this potential requires navigating new forms of technological dependence and geopolitical competition.
Electrification represents something genuinely novel: it's fundamentally more abstract than coal or gasoline. If modernization tracks the progress of abstraction—from barter to money, from gold to fiat currency, from atoms to bits—then the shift from combustion to electrons marks another step in civilization's dematerialization. China, by this logic, has become the new epicenter of modernization, not through ideology but through infrastructure that enables higher forms of abstraction and efficiency.
The age of electrostates has begun, marking not just a new energy regime but a new metabolism of modernity itself. What new forms of power and dependency will emerge from this electric reordering of the world?