If Metabolism is the big picture of planetary politics, chips and cables are the two core commodities. Chips cuz AI and cables cuz electrification. China is doubling down on cables and the US on chips (not that either will entirely neglect the other commodity). Ben Thompson's defence of the US taking a 10% stake in Intel should be read against this background:

if the US needs explicit industrial policy, why not nationalize some of the key assets?

The U.S. government's decision to acquire a 10% stake in Intel reflects deep geopolitical and strategic concerns surrounding semiconductor manufacturing. The global chip industry is dominated by companies like Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung, whose advanced foundries are geographically close to China, posing significant national security risks. The U.S. relies heavily on these foreign manufacturers for critical chips used not only in consumer electronics but also in military and AI applications. A potential Chinese attack on Taiwan could disrupt this supply, threatening both economic stability and technological leadership.

Intel, once a dominant player, has struggled due to long-term strategic missteps, such as missing the mobile chip market and failing to develop a competitive foundry business. To reduce dependence on foreign suppliers and secure the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, Intel must transform into a foundry capable of serving external customers. However, Intel faces a credibility problem: customers hesitate to commit without assurance that Intel will remain a viable manufacturer long-term.

Government ownership aims to provide this guarantee, ensuring Intel’s continued investment in manufacturing capacity. While critics warn of political interference and market distortions, the unique challenges of semiconductor production—requiring massive capital, decades of expertise, and stable demand—make government involvement a pragmatic, if imperfect, solution to safeguard U.S. technological sovereignty and national security.